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Abstract 
This paper seeks to uncover and examine the complex set of governance challenges 
associated with transforming energy distribution networks, which play a key enabling role in 
a low carbon energy transition. We argue that, although the importance of such 
infrastructure networks to sustainability and low carbon transitions in the energy, water and 
mobility sectors is clear, there is relatively little understanding of the social and institutional 
dimension of these systems and appropriate governance strategies for their transformation. 
This may be because the prevalent model of infrastructure governance in the energy and 
other sectors has prioritised short term time horizons and static efficiencies. In this paper we 
draw on the social shaping of technology literature to develop a broader understanding of 
infrastructure change as a dynamic socio-technical process. The empirical focus of the paper 
is on the development of more flexible and sustainable energy distribution systems as key 
enablers for the UK ?ƐůŽǁĐĂƌďŽŶƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶ. Focusing on electricity and heat networks we 
identify a range of governance challenges along ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƉŚĂƐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ ?ŝŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ 
lifecycle ?, and we draw lessons for the development of governance frameworks for the 
transformation of energy infrastructure more generally. 
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1 Introduction 
It is widely recognised that the energy systems of industrialised countries are unsustainable 
and require fundamental restructuring. The growing scientific consensus surrounding 
anthropogenic climate change along with concerns over energy security and fossil fuel 
depletion have prompted much discussion over the need to accelerate transformational 
change towards low carbon energy systems (Foxon and Pearson, 2007, Foxon et al., 2010). 
So far, in analyses of energy transitions, much of the discussion has centered around supply 
side issues with the relative merits of different generation options being debated, along 
with the various institutional barriers to the diffusion of renewable technologies e.g. wind 
power, biomass and solar (Negro et al., 2007, Verbong and Geels, 2007, Foxon et al., 2005). 
More recently a smaller number of studies have begun to explore the role of the demand 
side in the energy transition and implications for the way we use energy in our everyday 
lives (Nye et al., 2009, Hargreaves et al., 2010). However, there have been surprisingly few 
studies which explicitly explore the network components of energy systems  W the pipes and 
wires  W which have unique technical and institutional characteristics (Frantzeskaki and 
Loorbach, 2010, Markard, 2011, Künneke, 2008, Bolton and Hawkes, 2013).  
Similar sentiments have been expressed in a recent special section of this journal on 
"Infrastructures and Transitions" (Loorbach et al., 2010), where the authors argued that 
across a number of sectors (water, energy, transport) the role of infrastructure networks in 
enabling or constraining broader sustainability transitions will be crucial. They highlighted 
the importance of infrastructures, whether they are distributive (energy, water), 
communicative (mobility) or accumulative (waste management), in acting as platforms 
which enable more sustainable production and consumption practices to evolve 
(Frantzeskaki and Loorbach, 2010).  The authors argued however that the stability of 
infrastructure systems ŵĂǇ ?ƉŽƐĞĂŵĂũŽƌďĂƌƌŝĞƌƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĚĞƐŝƌĞĚƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇ
ƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?and hence argue the need for a better understanding of the interactions 
between social and technological drivers for change and stability (Loorbach et al., 2010: 
p.1195). 
In this paper we adopt a socio-technical systems approach to analyse the role of energy 
distribution grids in enabling the low carbon transition in the UK, focusing on the particular 
governance challenges faced in the electricity and heat sectors. These sectors account for a 
substantial proportion of UK total energy consumption (approximately  22% and 41% 
respectively (DECC, 2009a)), and along with transport, decarbonising electricity and heat will 
ďĞŬĞǇƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀŝŶŐƚŚĞh<ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƚĂƌŐĞƚŽĨat least an 80% reduction  in greenhouse 
gas emissions from 1990 levels by 2050. In a number of respects (renewables integration, 
system efficiency, demand side management), distribution grids which can integrate new 
forms of supply and demand side practices in these sectors will be important enablers for a 
low carbon transition.  
While there has been a degree of focus on the technical and engineering challenges of 
developing more flexible energy distribution networks, particularly in the electricity sector 
(Strbac et al., 2006, Djapic et al., 2007), the aim of this paper is to focus on the institutional 
and governance challenges of transforming energy distribution systems. The paper argues 
that societies need to move beyond the traditional governance model for distribution (and 
other energy) networks which prioritises short term efficiencies in incumbent sectors (gas 
and electricity). A more  “innovation friendly ? governance model is needed to take into 
account the challenges to be faced at different stages of what we refer to as the 
infrastructure lifecycle - from early stage development of local networks, through to the 
transformation of incumbent national grids. We base our argument on insights from 
literature on the social shaping of technology and socio-technical systems studies and 
illustrate it using empirical examples of the UK electricity and heat sectors.  
The paper is structured as follows: We begin in the next section by providing a brief 
literature overview and how we seek to operationalize relevant aspects to analyse the 
transformation of distribution grids in the UK. Then, in section 3, we outline ƚŚĞh< ?Ɛ
prospective low carbon transition, highlighting electricity and heat distribution systems and 
their importance as enablers for this. In section 4 we focus on the specific challenges being 
faced in the electricity and heat sectors in the UK: The electricity distribution case illustrates 
the difficulties faced in transforming highly regulated incumbent systems which are locked-
in to an established technological trajectory, while the heat case illustrates the challenges of 
developing new infrastructures in more local/urban contexts. In each of the cases, we 
discuss the roles of a range of actors in the transformation process including government, 
private network operators, local authorities and the energy regulator. In the final sections 
we discuss the broader relevance of our analysis for low carbon infrastructure 
transformation more generally, focusing on lessons and insights for the development of 
more effective and coherent approaches to infrastructure governance. 
2 Framing and understanding governance challenges for infrastructure transformation 
2.1 A socio-technical understanding of infrastructure change 
Realising the benefits of more flexible and sustainable systems of energy distribution will 
require an understanding of the nature of the governance challenge in transforming large 
scale and complex infrastructure systems. In order to do this we draw from and 
operationalise the socio-technical approach to analysing the dynamics and long term 
evolution of large scale technical systems such as energy infrastructure. This approach is 
situated within the wider field of the social shaping of technology, a basic premise being 
that the transformation of technologies and technical systems is not determined by any 
scientific, technological or economic rationality, rather there are a wide range of social, 
political and institutional factors which interact in a systemic fashion to  influence their 
development (Williams and Edge, 1996, Russell and Williams, 2002, Hughes, 1987, Pinch and 
Bijker, 1987). The approach seeks to understand and unpack coevolutionary interactions 
between a broad range of social and institutional factors such as politics, culture, 
institutional frameworks and the strategies and practices of a range of actors including, for 
example, utility companies, sector regulators, policy makers, and end users (Bolton and 
Foxon, 2011, Foxon, 2011, Geels, 2005a).  
In the specific case of infrastructure based sectors such as energy distribution, but also 
including transport and water, we must consider a number of specific techno-economic 
characteristics (Finger et al., 2005, Künneke, 1999) which mean that these sectors in 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ?ƚǇƉŝĐĂůůǇĞǀŽůǀĞŐƌĂĚƵĂůůǇĂŶĚǁŝƚŚŽŶůǇŝŶĐƌĞŵĞŶƚĂůĐŚĂŶŐĞƐĂůŽŶŐĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ
paths (path-dependencǇ ? ? ?ĂŶĚĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚŐŽǀĞƌŶŝŶŐƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůĐŚĂŶŐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞƐĞƐĞĐƚŽƌƐǁŝůů
be  ?even more challenging than in conventional sectors ? (Markard, 2011: p.115): 
x Infrastructure services are often essential to everyday life and are therefore classed 
as public utilities or social goods. Systems such as transport, energy and 
communications produce positive (e.g. economic growth) and negative (e.g. visual 
and noise pollution) effects which make it difficult to disaggregate costs and benefits 
into a clear pricing regime. 
x Due to the physical and economic characteristics of infrastructure networks, they 
tend to be natural monopolies, therefore the services they provide are not traded in 
markets but are subject to some form of influence by the state e.g. through 
regulation or public ownership. 
x Infrastructure networks are large scale and complex technical systems and their 
successful operation requires the mutual interaction between large numbers of 
individual components. In order to achieve this technical complementarity, 
institutional arrangements which coordinate a range of both public and private 
actors are required (Künneke, 1999). 
In the sub-sections below, we brief overview of key strands of the socio-technical systems 
literature, and following this we attempt to operationalise key insights to identify and 
analyse governance challenge in the transformation of energy distribution networks.  
2.1.1 Large Technical Systems  
The origins of the socio-technical systems approach can be traced to the early 1980s when a 
body of literature developed which sought to understand the emergence and long term 
evolution of infrastructures, termed Large technical Systems (LTS) (Hughes, 1983, 
Summerton, 1994, Coutard, 1999). WĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝŶĨůƵĞŶƚŝĂůŚĂƐďĞĞŶdŚŽŵĂƐ,ƵŐŚĞƐ ?ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ
of the development of electricity systems in the 19th and early 20th centuries (Hughes, 
1983) ?,ƵŐŚĞƐ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚǁĂƐƵŶŝƋƵĞŝŶƚŚĂƚƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ>d^ƐĂƐƉƵƌĞůǇƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů
artefacts, he outlined how politics, geography, and influential individuals (system builders) 
played a role in shaping the early emergence of these systems. Hughes summarises the 
systems approach as follows: 
 ?>ĂƌŐĞƐĐĂůĞƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐĞůĞĐƚƌŝĐůŝŐŚƚĂŶĚƉŽǁĞƌƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ?
incorporate not only technical and physical things such as generators, 
transformers and high-voltage transmission lines, but also utility companies, 
electrical manufacturers and reinforcing institutions such as regulatory 
ĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐĂŶĚůĂǁƐ ?(Hughes, 1983: p.2) 
A central analytical focus of the LTS literature has been to analyse the ways in which 
technical systems interact or coevolve with their environment to produce context specific 
 ?technical styles ? ?In his cross country/city comparison of London, Berlin and Chicago, 
Hughes (1983) showed how cultural, political and social differences between countries were 
reflected in the technologies that were adopted. In line with the social shaping of 
technology research agenda (Bijker, 1995, Bijker and Law, 1992, Pinch and Bijker, 1987), 
Hughes noted that:  
 ?dŚĞƐƚǇůĞŽĨĞĂĐŚƐǇƐƚĞŵǁĂƐĨŽƵŶĚƚŽďĞďĂƐĞd on entrepreneurial drive 
and decisions, economic principles, legislative constraints or supports, 
institutional structures, historical contingencies, and geographical factors, 
ďŽƚŚŚƵŵĂŶĂŶĚŶĂƚƵƌĂů ?(Hughes 1983, p.462) 
In their early stages, electricity systems emerged in specific local contexts, however, over 
time, as technical or social constraints to system evolution and growth were overcome 
(Hughes termed these Reverse Salients), the systems developed an inner momentum and 
became a more coherent set of technologies and institutions. As the process unfolded 
across cities, regions and eventually nations, system builders were replaced by managers 
and financiers, with specific forms of technical knowledge becoming codified and 
institutionalised.  
2.1.2 Socio-Technical Transitions 
tŚŝůĞ,ƵŐŚĞƐ ?ǁŽƌŬ accounts for the early emergence and expansion of systems, in more 
recent years there has been a growing interest in understanding the mechanisms by which 
established systems undergo structural  transformations, or system innovations (Geels, 
2005b). The socio-technical transitions approach argues that many contemporary 
infrastructure based sectors such as water, energy and mobility are experiencing lock-in to 
unsustainable trajectories resulting from path dependent change and the presence of 
selection environment which promotes incremental rather than radical innovation (Unruh, 
2000, Bolton and Foxon, 2011). Within the literature, the predominant approach to framing 
and understanding the transformation of such large scale and institutionally embedded 
systems has been to adopt a multi-level perspective (MLP), where system innovations occur 
due to interactions between the landscape (macro), regime (meso) and niche (micro) levels 
(Geels, 2005b). Incumbent systems, or socio-technical regimes, are relatively stable 
configurations of institutions, practices and technologies which underpin the delivery of 
essential societal services e.g. energy supply, mobility, housing etc. Over time, the social and 
technical dimensions of regimes tend to coevolve in a path dependent manner thus making 
them prone to inertia or lock-in  W similar to the momentum concept in the LTS literature. 
Niches, on the other hand, are less constrained spaces which allow greater scope for agency 
and for radical technical and organisational innovations to emerge. Activity within regimes 
and niches are contextualised by broader socio-technical landscapes, which refer to macro 
level structural trends in society beyond the influence of individual regimes e.g. climate 
change, political and economic paradigms. In cases where transitions occur, dynamics within 
and between the three levels create windows of opportunity for radical innovations, which 
had been developing in dispersed niches, to diffuse. Depending on the disruptive nature of 
the innovations and adaptive capacity of the regime (Smith et al., 2005), this can undermine 
regime structures, leading to the development of a new type of system.  
Developed by a group of Dutch researchers, the approach builds upon a number of 
historical studies of past transitions where it is observed that structural changes in sectors, 
or periods of systemic innovation, tend to stretch out over long periods of time - in the 
region of 50 years - and are characterised by different patterns of transformation called 
transition pathways (Geels and Schot, 2007, Foxon et al., 2010). Examples of their studies 
include the transition from sailing ships to steam ships (Geels, 2002), and the development 
of urban water infrastructures in the Netherlands (Geels, 2005a).  
2.2 Operationalising insights - an integrative lifecycle approach 
In order to operationalise these basic insights of socio-technical systems literatures outlined 
above to identify and assess key governance challenges associated with the transformation 
distribution and other infrastructure networks, we propose an infrastructure lifecycle model 
(figure 1). Here, drawing from the LTS insights of Hughes (Hughes, 1983) and Kaijser (2004) 
who stress the phased nature of infrastructure evolution, we distinguish between four 
different stages of the infrastructure lifecycle. Essentially we argue that different types of 
governance challenges will be faced along the different phases of the infrastructure 
lifecycle, and these will require policy makers and regulators to move beyond their 
traditional focus on short term efficiencies. The phases we identify are as follows: 
In the system building and establishment phase, new systems emerge within niches e.g. the 
development of small scale urban electricity systems in the late 19th century. These systems 
will tend to be geographically dispersed niches with a diverse range of technologies and 
engineering practices, or technical styles, being adopted in different contexts. In the system 
expansion and momentum phase, as standards develop and dominant designs emerge 
(Klepper, 1997), systems expand and develop an internal momentum of their own (Hughes, 
1983). Over time these systems interconnect over wider geographic areas - across cities, 
regions, nations and even international boundaries. Long term investments are made in 
fixed assets and this sunken capital reinforces a lock-in to a particular technological 
trajectory, thus systems become prone to stagnation and inertia. Key mechanisms of this 
lock-in include embedded organisational practices or routines of incumbent organisations, 
benefits of scale economies and network effects, where interconnection of multiple 
components of a system provides durability. However, over time assets inevitably age, and 
developments at the landscape level such as climate change and energy security concerns 
will exert influence, tending to destabilise the regime structures in the system transition and 
renewal phase. The incumbent regime actors either adapt to new circumstances and a 
system renewal occurs, or a more radical transition process occurs where niche level actors 
exploit these windows of opportunity, leading to the development of a qualitatively new 
type of system. 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1: The Infrastructure Lifecycle 
 
Such a cyclical model of innovation, where long periods of gradual/incremental change are 
punctuated by short periods of  more radical fundamental change is of course well 
established in the Schumpeterian inspired literatures on evolutionary economics (Dosi, 
1982, Freeman and Louçã, 2001, Freeman, 1988), industry dynamics (Klepper, 1997, 
Abernathy and Clark, 1985), and more recently the socio-technical transitions approach 
outlined above (Geels, 2002). Also, the wider literature on science and technology studies 
emphasises the complex, non-deterministic and non-linear relationship between technology 
and society as a distinct problem for policy, and highlights the need to better understand 
 ?ƚŚĞprocesses of technological change ?ĂŶĚ ?ĞŶŐĂŐĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞcontent of technological 
ĂƌƚĞĨĂĐƚƐĂŶĚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ? (Williams, 2002: p. 5).  
The aim of this paper is operationalise these more nuanced understandings of the process 
of technical change as a socio-technical and cyclical process to address policy and 
governance challenges related to the role of energy distribution networks in enabling a low 
carbon energy transition. 
3 Energy distribution networks and the UK low carbon transition 
In 2008, the UK enshrined into law a commitment to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 
80% by 2050, and to put in place intermediate 5-yearly carbon budgets towards this target. 
Significant contributions to these reductions are expected to come from the electricity and 
heating sectors, implying potentially radical changes to end-use demands, supply options, 
and transmission and distribution networks.  
In relation to energy distribution in the UK the key phases of the infrastructure lifecycle are 
likely to be stagnation and inertia moving into renewal and transition and system building 
and establishment moving into expansion and momentum. Our empirical cases of UK 
electricity and heat distribution networks respectively highlight the nature of the 
governance challenge being faced at these two different phases in the overall context of the 
decarbonisation of the UK economy. Before outlining these cases in more depth, in the 
paragraphs below we briefly discuss broader relationship between UK energy 
infrastructures and their role in enabling long term decarbonisation.  
Due to the more advanced development of lower carbon options in the electricity sector 
(e.g. renewables and nuclear) and concerns over energy security due to ageing plant (CCC, 
2010, DECC, 2012, Ofgem, 2012), power sector decarbonisation is generally seen as a 
short/medium term priority in UK energy policy. While much of the mainstream debate has 
on the need to deploy new forms of large scale generation (e.g. offshore wind, carbon 
capture and storage, nuclear) which is connected to high voltage national transmission 
grids, a number of recent studies have argued that there is also a need to consider new 
forms of distribution system planning at the local and regional scales. For example, 
McDonald (2008), in reviewing developments in electricity network technologies and 
concepts, highlighted the importance of active and intelligent electricity distribution 
networks to maintain power quality with increasing levels of smaller scale  intermittent 
reŶĞǁĂďůĞĐŽŶŶĞĐƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶŐƌŝĚƐ ?,ĞĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚ ?ĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůŶĞƚǁŽƌŬĚĞƐŝŐŶ
has led to less sophisticated system control and management structures with lower levels of 
ĂƵƚŽŵĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƉůĂĐĞ ?ĂŶĚ ?ƐŝŵŝůĂƌƚŽĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůƚƌĂŶƐŵŝƐƐ ŽŶŶĞƚǁŽƌŬƐ ?ŵŽre active 
ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐĂŶĚƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐǁŝůůďĞƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚĂƚƚŚĞĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶůĞǀĞů ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Heat, unlike electricity, is generally not a grid based system in the UK, rather heating for the 
majority of buildings is predominantly gas fuelled2 (BERR, 2008), with 18-20 million 
individual gas boilers installed in dwellings (DECC, 2011). Approximately 70% of all domestic, 
commercial and industrial  heat demands in the UK is met from natural gas, largely due to 
historical reasons, such as the (until recent) availability of relatively cheap gas from North 
Sea reserves and the development of an extensive gas distribution network since the 
1960s/70s (Arapostathis et al., 2013). In its recently published heat strategy (DECC, 2013b), 
the UK Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) emphasised the need for a 
diversity of solutions in order to move away from a heavy reliance on gas and decarbonise 
this sector: this includes the roll out of electric air and ground source heat pumps which 
extract and recirculate low temperature heat, increased use of biomass boilers and the 
development of local district heating networks which are supplied from efficient gas-fired or 
biomass combined heat and power plants. The latter of these proposed solutions will 
necessitate the development of an extensive network of distribution pipes, particularly in 
densely populated urban areas. However, as we discuss later in the paper, heat distribution 
has to date been an underdeveloped aspect of the UK energy infrastructure, unlike more 
well developed heat markets such as in the Nordic countries.  
3.1 Distribution networks as enablers for decarbonisation 
The future of energy distribution in the context of the 2050 low carbon transition is of 
course highly uncertain and likely to be shaped by a range of innovations in other areas of 
the energy chain (generation, transmission, end use), along with changes to the wider 
regulatory and policy frameworks governing this energy system (Foxon, 2013). With this in 
mind, in the subsections below we identify three broad areas where distribution systems 
are likely to act as important enablers for a low carbon transition across alternative low 
carbon pathways. 
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 Approximately 81% gas, and around 8% electricity and oil 
3.1.1 Integration of renewables 
Although the overall levels of renewables in the electricity and heat sectors are relatively 
low, they have been growing in the UK3 (DECC, 2013a), and therefore the ability of 
distribution systems to integrate renewables will be crucially important. For example, the 
connection of microgeneration such as solar PV could result in capacity constraints on the 
low voltage electricity distribution networks, particularly in densely populated urban areas, 
while rural networks may experience voltage rise issues due to the connection of wind. The 
ability of distribution network operators (DNOs) to manage more complex flows on their 
networks will be key. For the case of renewable heat, although it is envisioned that much of 
heat supply will be electrified (CCC, 2008), the economic prospects of low carbon 
technologies such as CHP with biomass fuel will be improved by the development of local 
heat distribution networks where the heat can be captured. This will be dependent on the 
nature and density of demand/loads within specific localities (DECC, 2009b, PÖYRY, 2009, 
UKGBC, 2010).  
3.1.2 Promoting Energy Efficiency 
There are a number of ways that sustainable distribution systems could promote energy 
efficiency, particularly relating to the  avoidance of thermal losses.. For example, in city 
scale district energy (DE) schemes involving combined heat and power with district heating 
(CHP/DH), energy efficiency approaches 70%, as opposed to 40% for conventional plant 
(Kelly and Pollitt, 2010) ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞǁĂƐƚĞŚĞĂƚŝƐ ?ĚƵŵƉĞĚ ? ?Further savings can be achieved 
by balancing and sequencing a range of loads, leading to the more efficient utilisation of 
fuel, compared to a large number of less efficient individual boilers which often operate at 
part load (Roberts, 2008). Figures from the Department of Energy and Climate Change 
(DECC) show that if gas-fired CHP were the main energy source for domestic and 
commercial heat and power, this would save approximately 9.8 MtCO2 per annum, and if a 
biomass source is used this could potentially rise to 19.3 MtCO2 (DECC, 2009b). For the case 
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 Measured against targets set in the EU 2009 EU Renewable Energy Directive, as of 2012 10.8% of electricity 
generation was from renewable sources, rising from 5.4% in 2008, while the level of heat (and cooling)  from 
renewable sources was 3.2% rising from 2.1% in 2008  (see Table 6.7). 
of electricity distribution, utilising flexible approaches such as demand shifting (Shaw et al., 
2009) and more sophisticated monitoring techniques e.g. thermal ratings, can help to 
reduce losses, which account for up to 5-6% of electricity distributed. 
3.1.3 Promoting DSM 
A third area where distribution systems will be important for the low carbon transition is in 
integrating with the demand side and promoting demand side management (DSM). In the 
electricity sector, the traditional role of a distribution network has been to reliably deliver 
power to the customer in a one way direction. However, as we move away from this 
 ?ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĂŶĚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ ? paradigm, the demand side, along with increased storage capacity and 
interconnection (Taylor et al., 2013), will become a more active component in the electricity 
system in order to deal with the issue of intermittency, but also as a means of making 
energy use more visible to the customer (Hargreaves et al., 2010). Studies have shown that 
integrating the demand side with the operation of the upstream asset base can lead to cost 
savings by reducing capacity margins, offsetting network reinforcements to accommodate 
low carbon technologies and avoiding investment in expensive peaking plant to deal with 
intermittency (Strbac et al., 2010). The UK government is planning to roll out smart meters 
to all domestic customers beginning in 2015, and because customers are connected to the 
distribution networks, these systems will become an increasingly important part of 
developing a more interactive relationship between customers and the electricity system. 
Such issues have become central to debates surrounding smart grids (EU, 2006, DECC, 
2009c). 
Of course the changes required to develop a supporting energy infrastructure to realise the 
low carbon transition go deeper than the technical issues which were emphasised here. In 
the next section we focus on ways of framing and understanding the governance challenges 
likely to be encountered in transforming large scale systems such as distribution networks 
as we enter into the renewal and transition (electricity case) and system building and 
establishment moving into expansion and momentum (heat case) phases.    
4 Challenges at Different Stages of the Infrastructure Lifecycle 
Drawing on empirical case studies of electricity distribution and district heat networks we 
now discuss how some key governance challenges are being encountered in the UK context 
and discuss the extent to which they are being addressed.  
For each of the cases, selected policy documents were reviewed to provide an overview and 
also to give an outline of the most significant developments which have taken place within 
each sector over approximately the past ten years. In order to complement this 
documentary analysis, over forty semi-structured interviews were conducted with key 
stakeholders throughout the study period (2009-2011). The table below illustrates the range 
of stakeholders interviewed as part of both cases and the number of interviews conducted 
in each category. The sections below provide a summary of key governance challenges to be 
addressed in each case (For a more detailed analysis of the cases see: Bolton, 2011) 
Table 1: List of Stakeholders Interviewed 
 
4.1 Case #1: From stagnation to transition - developing active electricity distribution 
Networks 
The current structure of the electricity distribution sector in the UK emerged following the 
1989 Electricity Act which established licences for 14 private regional electricity companies 
(RECs). Following the Utilities Act in 2000 and the introduction of retail competition, a 
specialised distribution licence was created for the 14 areas. Over the years, there have 
been a number of mergers and acquisitions, and today there are seven companies who 
operate the 14 distribution licences - these are termed Distribution Network Operators 
(DNOs). Due to the fact that distribution networks are organised as regional monopolies, the 
distribution of electricity is treated largely as a non-competitive activity which is governed 
by a sector regulator - Ofgem.  
4.1.1 System Renewal and Transition: The Need for Active Distribution Systems 
Traditionally, electricity distribution systems have been operated in a passive manner with 
electricity flowing one way along the value chain from generation, transmission, distribution 
and on to the end customer (Strbac, 2008). A largely passive distribution and demand side 
has evolved, with the vast majority of generation being connected at the transmission side 
and network capacity being sized to meet peak demands. However, as discussed in the 
previous section, there are two developments which have called this approach into question 
and highlighted the need for renewal and transition: an increasing trend towards 
investment in small and medium scale generation which is connected at the distribution 
side, such as solar power and CHP  W incentivised by subsidies provided by ROCs and FITs  W 
and the planned roll out of smart metering to all domestic households, due to commence in 
2015.  
The development of more  ?active ? and  ?smarter ? approaches to network planning and 
operation is seen as a key strategy to integrate medium and small scale distributed 
generation and DSM whilst avoiding a large scale and expensive programme of 
reinforcements (Strbac, 2008, Strbac et al., 2009). Active Network Management (ANM) is an 
all-encompassing concept involving actively managing both generation and the demand side 
i.e.  ?controlling the inputs onto the network from generators or storage owners (supply-side 
options) or the offtakes from the network by customers (demand-side options) ? (Frontier, 
2010). However, the regulatory framework governing the activities of the DNOs in the UK 
has been identified as a significant barrier to the development of ANM (Woodman and 
Baker, 2008, Mitchell and Woodman, 2010). Following the privatization of the UK electricity 
industry in 1990, the natural monopoly components of the value chain  W transmission and 
distribution  W have been subject to periodic price control reviews and the application of 
incentive regulation. This has had the effect of incentivizing the DNOs to achieve significant 
cost savings, primarily through reducing the day-to-day costs of running their operations 
(Jamasb and Pollitt, 2007), but it has acted as a disincentive to investment in innovative 
approaches to network management, as DNOs benefit more from reinforcing their 
networks, thus expanding their asset base (Bolton and Foxon, 2011, Woodman and Baker, 
2008, Mitchell, 2008).  
4.1.2 From Static to Dynamic Efficiencies 
In recent years, there has been a growing recognition that the regulatory framework 
governing distribution networks will need to change in order to promote system renewal 
and transition and the development of ANM and smarter grids (OFGEM, 2010b). As 
discussed above, during the system stagnation and inertia phase, the regulatory framework 
was designed ƚŽ ?ƐǁĞĂƚƚŚĞĂƐƐĞƚƐ ?ĂŶĚƌĞĚƵĐĞƚŚĞĚĂǇ-to-day costs of operating distribution 
systems - the operational expenditure or OPEX (Helm, 2004, Bolton and Foxon, 2011). 
However, the context has changed due to the ageing of the underlying asset base (much of 
which was installed during the period of system expansion under public ownership), and the 
recent shift in focus of UK energy policy towards decarbonisation and transformation, rather 
than purely cost reduction. This has led to a mismatch between the regulatory regime 
designed for the stagnation and inertia phase and the need for distribution networks to 
enter into the renewal and transition phase. As a result of the growing need for investment 
in the infrastructure asset base and for companies to develop longer term decision making 
horizons, the need to align the governance framework with the new phase of the 
infrastructure lifecycle has become apparent. This has introduced new complexities and 
risks for the regulator.  
Since privatisation, the sector regulator Ofgem has had a clear mandate to reduce the costs 
of energy distribution and has successfully done so through successive price control reviews 
by incentivising the network companies to reduce the costs of operating their networks 
against the RPI inflation index  W termed RPI-x regulation (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2007). 
However, issues associated with the need for renewal and system transition, such as 
increasing numbers of DG connections and the demand for new investment in the capital 
base (capital expenditure or CAPEX), have raised concerns over a drop in the standards of 
service quality delivered by the network companies e.g. the number of outages and 
interruptions to supply. Pointing to a potentially damaging trade-off between the drive for 
OPEX built into the regulatory framework and the increasing need for efficient CAPEX, 
Giannakis et al. argue that the strong downward pressure on OPEX  ?ŵĂǇƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĮƌŵƐǁŝƚŚ
distorted incentives that lead them to adopt an inefficient output mix ? because companies 
have been able to benefit to a greater degree from OPEX rather than CAPEX efficiencies 
(Giannakis et al., 2005). Also, under the current incentive structure, the strong emphasis on 
OPEX efficiency may result in a situation where a network operator invests in like for like 
asset replacements and off the shelf technologies, which have low maintenance costs, 
rather than innovative ANM based solutions. This drive for short term cost and operational 
efficiencies since liberalisation has been partially responsible for a drop-off in basic R&D 
funding across the wider energy sector (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2008, Jamasb and Pollitt, 2011). 
Ofgem has noted that this lack of emphasis on achieving an efficient system renewal and 
transition provides network companies  ?with a skewed incentive to solve network 
performance or constraint problems through further investment in transformers and cables, 
rather than maintaining existing assets to prolong their life or seeking to reduce or manage 
load, even when the latter solution is cheaper ? (OFGEM, 2009a: p.27).  
Recognising that the conventional RPI-x approach may not be fit for purpose in the renewal 
and transition phase, in 2009 Ofgem initiated a review of their approach to regulating 
energy networks, termed RPI-x@20 (Ofgem, 2009b). The significant output of the review 
has been proposals for an adapted regulatory framework which will form the basis of the 
price control review for electricity distribution in 2015 (OFGEM, 2010d), known as  ?Revenue 
= Incentives + Innovation + Outputs ?, or RIIO. This has as its central feature to accelerate the 
move towards an outputs-led regime where, in order to mitigate against the risks of poor 
service quality outlined above, the regulator specifies certain performance criteria, with 
higher returns for those companies who deliver these at a lower cost. This form of ex-post 
evaluation marks a significant change from the conventional approach where companies 
were given a greater degree of autonomy in how they achieve efficiencies during a price 
control period. As part of this, RIIO will see the introduction of differential treatment of 
network companies, i.e.  ?Network companies could earn a below average return if they fail 
to deliver outputs or if they deliver them inefficiently ? (OFGEM, 2010b). Also, a key feature 
of the proposal is to promote CAPEX efficiency by extending the regulatory period (from 5 to 
8 years), in order to incentivise longer decision making horizons, requiring companies to 
develop longer term business plan proposals.  
4.1.3 Promoting Innovation in a Regulated Sector 
ŶŽƚĂďůĞĨĞĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞh<ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌ ?Ɛefforts to bring about system renewal and transition 
has been the introduction of specific incentives for innovation (Bolton and Foxon, 2011). It 
was felt that an artificial innovation incentive was needed due to the fact that in a natural 
monopoly environment, innovation is unlikely to emerge as an outcome of conventional 
competitive processes. Similar problems will be faced in many infrastructure based sectors 
in the stagnation and inertia phase because, as described in section 2, they tend to display 
natural monopoly features. Also, as the following quote from an energy company employee 
suggests, due to the RPI-x regulatory incentive structure, DNOs have tended to develop low 
risk business strategies with a conservative culture towards risk taking becoming embedded 
within their organisations:  
 ?/ ?ŵŶŽƚƐƵƌĞ ? ? ? ƚŚĂƚǁĞ ?ƌĞƚŚat big on innovation ourselves ( ?) ǁĞ ?ƌĞĂ
utility that runs a business and a set of assets and those assets we buy from 
manufacturers, equipment manufacturers of one description or another ?
(Interview  ? Energy Company) 
In 2005, Ofgem introduced an R&D funding mechanism - the Innovation Funding Incentive 
(IFI) - where each DNO was permitted to spend up to 0.5% of its regulated revenue on R&D 
which  ?allows a DNO to pass through to customers 80% (tapered from 90% to 70% from 
2005 to 2010) of the cost of eligible IFI projects ? (OFGEM, 2010c).  Along with the IFI, a 
measure to promote trials of network innovations was also introduced called Registered 
Power Zones (RPZ), where a DNO could spend up to £500,000/year and earn enhanced 
revenues for the connection of DGs. RPZ offered  ?an additional incentive of an extra 
£3/kW/year (over and above the main DG incentive) for a five year period commencing on 
the date of commissioning of the project ? (OFGEM, 2004), this was  ?capped at £0.5 million 
per DNO per year ? (OFGEM, 2005). Although the introduction of a specific innovation 
mechanism was welcomed, there was a poor uptake by the DNOs, in part due to the lack of 
ambition of the scheme itself. One interviewee describes it as: 
 ? ?a failure, there arĞŽŶůǇ ?ƐĐŚĞŵĞƐĂĨƚĞƌ ?Žƌ ?ǇĞĂƌƐ ?dŚĞƌĞ ?ƐŶŽŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞ
for the network to try something [which] may undermine its business 
ŵŽĚĞů ?(Interview - Academia) 
Whilst continuing the IFI, the regulator replaced the RPZ scheme with the Low Carbon 
Networks (LCN) Fund in 2010. Similar to the RPZ scheme, the aim of the LCN Fund is to  ?try 
to replicate the incentives on unregulated companies to innovate ? (OFGEM, 2010a). A 
significant difference however is that the LCN Fund is not confined to the connection of DG 
alone, but seeks to promote ANM more explicitly, in particular by incentivising collaboration 
between parties cross the value chain, e.g. between DNOs and retail companies who are 
installing domestic smart meters.  
There are two tiers to the LCN Fund. The first tier of £80million is for smaller projects, with 
funding per DNO being limited annually. These projects are registered with Ofgem and in 
both 2010 and 2011 nine projects have been registered as tier one projects. The second tier 
provides £320million with Ofgem holding an  ?annual competition for project funding and 
the DNOs will compete against each other for an allocation of the funds ? (OFGEM, 2010d). 
Submissions are assessed by a panel of experts and each year a number of  ?flagship projects ? 
are awarded funding. There is also an ex-post  ?discretionary funding mechanism ? of 
£100million which  ?enables Ofgem to reward successful delivery and projects that bring 
particular value in helping the DNOs understand what investment, commercial 
arrangements and operating strategies they should be putting in place to provide security of 
supply at value for money for future network users, while doing all they can to tackle 
climate change ? (OFGEM, 2010d).  
Although it is too early to assess whether the LCN Fund is a success, it has largely been 
welcomed within the industry and as part of the RIIO proposals a similar program is planned 
for 2015, ĐĂůůĞĚƚŚĞ ?/ŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶ^ƚŝŵƵůƵƐ ?(OFGEM, 2010d). Innovation inventive schemes 
such as these are important not only in trialling new technologies associated with active 
distribution networks, but also in developing the capabilities and organisational routines 
necessary to promote innovation as a strategy within the network companies, which is 
necessary for system renewal and transition. Programs such as the LNCF can begin to 
change this culture within the sector; however, it is envisioned that over time specific 
ŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞƐĐŚĞŵĞƐǁŝůůďĞ ?ǁŽƵŶĚĚŽǁŶ ?ĂŶĚŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶǁŝůůŶĞĞd to become 
part of the day to day planning and operation of the networks (OFGEM, 2010d). It is as yet 
unclear, however, as to the mechanisms and processes by which innovation can be 
institutionally embedded within the mainstream regulatory process. 
4.2 Case #2: System building and expansion - city scale district energy schemes 
Unlike electricity distribution networks, the development of city-scale district energy 
schemes involving combined heat and power with district heating (CHP/DH) is a largely 
unregulated area and thus represents an example of a local distribution system at an earlier 
phase of the infrastructure lifecycle. Today in the UK, as in most other developed nations, 
the vast majority of electricity is generated at large centralised generating stations and 
transported long distances via a high voltage transmission grid and regional distribution 
systems. District heating, on the other hand, is organised on the basis of networking hot 
water or steam within a locality via a piped distribution network connected to the pipes and 
radiators within buildings (Roberts, 2008). 
Despite the potential efficiency benefits, CHP/DH has not developed to the same scale in 
the UK as in other European countries (Hawkey, 2012). Although some CHP/DH schemes are 
operating in in cities such as Nottingham, Aberdeen, Birmingham and London, these are 
relatively small and dispersed niches accounting for only 2% of overall heat demand (PÖYRY, 
2009) and 1% of households (Roberts, 2008). Electrical power from CHP accounts for 
approximately 6% of total capacity, with 98% of this being stand-alone industrial plants and 
only 2% district heating (Pollitt and Kelly, 2010). This is in contrast to Scandinavian 
countries; for example in Finland and Denmark district heating accounts for 49% and 60% of 
total supply respectively, and in Vienna 36% is supplied via heat pipes (PÖYRY, 2009). Strong 
local government involvement in coordinating a range of actors has been a significant 
feature of the diffusion of district heating in Scandinavian countries (Summerton, 1992); 
however, local authorities in the UK have had a more limited role energy planning and 
decision making (Russell, 1993, Russell, 1986). A recent study (DECC, 2013b) commissioned 
ďǇĨŽƌŝƚƐ ? ? ? ?ǁŚŝƚĞƉĂƉĞƌ P ?dŚĞ&ƵƚƵƌĞŽĨ,ĞĂƚŝŶŐ ?(DECC, 2013b) identified a wide 
range of barriers to the development of local authority led heat networks, key amongst 
these are  a lack of upfront funding for the initial capital cost of laying pipes, along with a 
lack of expertise and organisational capacity at a local level. However the report identified a 
wide range of their barriers, quoting from the report these include: 
x Uncertainty regarding longevity and reliability of customer demand 
x Uncertainty regarding reliable heat sources 
x Lack of regulation and inconsistent pricing of heat 
x Lack of generally accepted contract mechanisms 
x Lack of a generally accepted and established role for local authorities 
x Choice of heating system 
x Skills gaps 
x Access to land 
x Tax and business rates 
x Air quality approval. 
Following a brief overview of the role of local authorities, we discuss in more depth how 
creating new alignments of technology, organisational change and financing is particularly 
important in overcoming some of these systemic barriers.  
4.2.1 Local Authorities and CHP/DH in the UK 
There are a relatively small but growing number of local authorities in the UK actively 
involved in developing and expanding CHP/DH schemes within their localities. As part of our 
study we have observed that, for a number of reasons, some councils are looking towards 
DE and CHP/DH as a long term strategy to engage with the emerging sustainability and 
climate change agendas (cities and large towns in this category include: Southampton, 
Woking, London, Birmingham, Leicester, Nottingham, Sheffield and Aberdeen) (Bolton and 
Foxon, 2013). In part, this has been enabled by recent changes to legislation regarding the 
relationship between national and local government. For example, following the 
introduction of the Local Government Act and the Sustainable Communities Act in 2000 and 
2007 respectively, local authorities have gained new forms of functional and financial 
autonomy in this area  W in particular the  “power to do anything which they consider is likely 
to achieve ? economic, social and environmental well-being in their area including incurring 
expenditure (DCLG, 2000).  
Enabled by these legislative changes and prompted by rising energy prices and fuel poverty 
rates, councils have begun to take a more direct role in efforts to reduce the fuel bill of both 
the council itself and tenants in social housing. This is particularly the case within large city 
councils, often in former industrialized cities in the north of England e.g. Sheffield and 
Nottingham, and in densely populated inner city areas with a large social housing stock e.g. 
London and Aberdeen. Another significant motivating factor behind local authority 
involvement in the development of CHP/DH has been to promote low carbon development 
within their localities. Some of the councils are keen to use CHP/DH to attract new 
developments; for example, within Woking Borough areas of the town have been zoned and 
potential developers are incentivized to invest by the council offering connection to its 
district heating network.  
4.2.2 Instigating organisational change at the local level 
Due to the fact that councils have traditionally not had a prominent role in energy planning 
in the UK, they tend to lack the organizational capacity necessary to develop and expand DE 
schemes. Developing local energy infrastructures requires a degree of coordinated change 
across a number of council departments, such as planning, building services, finance, legal 
and procurement: this level of institutional flexibility tends not to be a feature of such large 
public sector organizations. A common feature across councils that have been successful in 
developing and expanding DE schemes has been the presence of district heating 
 ?ĐŚĂŵƉŝŽŶƐ ? who are key to bringing about the necessary coordinated and systemic change  
 W ƐŝŵŝůĂƌƚŽdŚŽŵĂƐ,ƵŐŚĞƐ ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵďƵŝůĚĞƌƐ(Hughes, 1983). These are highly motivated 
and knowledgeable individuals who carry out various functions including coordinating actors 
across a number of council departments, engaging with a range of external actors, and 
promoting the financial, social and environmental benefits of CHP/DH within the council 
chamber. From our interviews, we have identified two types of champion which have been 
associated with successful DE schemes  Wtechnical champions and political champions (see 
table 2 below). A technical champion, typically an employee of a council energy or building 
services department, possess the technical knowledge and capabilities required to develop 
CHP/DH, can learn from best practice both nationally and internationally and has project 
management skills. A political champion, on the other hand, as one interviewee notes, gets 
the issue  ?elevated up through the organization and get it right at the top, that high level 
buy-in ? (interviewee  W Local Authority). CHP/DH, being a large scale and risky investment, 
requires long term commitment, and this is particularly difficult in a political environment. 
The central role of a political champion, in some cases an elected official, is outlined by the 
following interviewee who works on the technical side of a DE scheme. The quote 
emphasizes the importance of promoting long term stability in an environment where the 
power dynamics within the council are constantly in flux: 
 ?He bought in to the scheme very early on, he came on the visits with us 
 ?ĂŶĚ ?ǁĞǁĞŶƚƚŽůŽŽŬĂƚŽƚŚĞƌůŽĐĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ? ? ĂŶĚŚĞďŽƵŐŚƚŝŶ ?ƐŽǁĞ
havĞ ? ? ?ďƵǇŝŶĂƚƚŚĂƚŚŝŐŚůĞǀĞů ?KŶĞŽĨƚŚĞƚŚŝŶŐƐƚŚĂƚŚĞůƉƐĚƌŝǀĞƚŚĂƚ
through was when, and you do get barriers to certain things like this, people 
ƐĂǇ ? ?ŝƐŝƚƌŝŐŚƚŚĂǀŝŶŐ ? ?ǇĞĂƌĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƐ ? ?zŽƵǁŝůůĂů ĂǇƐŐĞƚƚŚĞƐŬĞƉƚŝĐƐ ?
(Interview  ? Local Authority) 
Securing a level of alignment between the technical (bottom up) and political (top 
down) processes has been key in successful schemes. In the case of Woking Council, 
a leader in this area, the council Chief Executive who was involved in developing the 
energy strategy of the council since its inception, argues that  ?ŝƚ ?ƐĂĐŽŵďŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
political and technical, managerial ? requiring  ?strong political leadership and 
ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĂŶĚƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ?ŶĚŝĨǇŽƵĐĂŶ ?ƚŐĞƚƚŚŽƐĞ
three aliŐŶĞĚŝƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚǁŽƌŬ ? (Interview  W Local Authority).  
Table 2: The key functions of technical and political champions 
Technical Champion Political Champion 
x Improve decentralized energy knowledge 
base and capacity of the building 
services/energy management department 
x Learn from other successful schemes both 
nationally and internationally 
x Coordinate actors from a number of council 
departments 
x Scope out the potential demand for heating 
within the locality and develop an overall 
strategic vision for the expansion of the 
scheme 
x Manage the contractual arrangements for 
the building and operation of the scheme 
x Place CHP/DH on the political agenda 
x Enroll other councilors from across the 
political spectrum and create an advocacy 
coalition   
x Help to de-risk large scale investments by 
displaying a commitment to long term 
infrastructure development regardless of the 
political cycle 
x Use CHP/DH to advance the 
sustainability/low carbon agenda and raise 
the profile of the council 
 4.2.3 Aligning finance with technical innovation 
A second key institutional challenge in developing and expanding CHP/DH is that of 
financing what are relatively large infrastructure investments in cities. Due to the expense 
involved in laying distribution pipes, the upfront capital costs are substantial for CHP/DH 
(Laying pipes costs in the region of £1,000/metre). Securing project financing at a 
reasonable cost-of-capital can be difficult for DE for a number of reasons: the long payback 
period on investment, the lack of expertise in CHP/DH in the UK (PÖYRY, 2009), the long 
lead times involved in planning and delivering major infrastructure projects, and the fact 
that financial institutions in the UK have tended to be reluctant to invest in low carbon 
capital projects (Mitchell, 1994). To date, the main source of funding for CHP/DH has been 
through a range of grant schemes; however, the rapidly evolving energy policy environment 
in recent years has meant that these funding streams are temporary, thus undermining the 
long term certainty required for infrastructure investments. The following excerpt from an 
interview with a private CHP/DH operator illustrates that this has undermined investor 
confidence in the long term commercial viability of district heating:  
"What we have seen is that support mechanisms often disappear without a 
trace very quickly and with little warning and that has led to schemes being 
pulled at the last minute where funding disappears and can be quite an 
ƵŶƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďůĞƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ?Interview  ? DE Operator) 
Developing an organizational structure with contractual arrangements in place which reflect 
the level of risk that a council is willing to take on is key. There are a number of options 
available to councils including own funding where a capital fund is build up, perhaps from 
efficiency savings, over a number of years and re-invested in DH pipes. This can be 
combined with capital grants, and in a number of the cases, these capital grants are used 
alongside own funding to initiate projects. Another option is to enter into a long term 
energy services contract with a private sector partner (Hannon et al., 2013, Hawkey et al., 
2013). Here, the council acts as the anchor tenant around which the operator can expand a 
scheme throughout a city. This private sector model is attractive as, depending on the 
contractual arrangements in place, it transfers much of the investment and operational risk 
to the private sector, as the prices paid for energy services by the council will be index-
linked over the period. However, there are disadvantages: the required rate of return on 
new investments will likely be higher in this case, and because the private operator controls 
the operation and evolution of the system, there will be less scope for a local authority to 
integrate the CHP/DH scheme into their wider energy and climate change strategies. 
5 Discussion of governance strategies for infrastructure transition 
As highlighted by our cases, the governance of energy distribution networks is becoming 
increasingly complex with policy makers and regulators having to deal with a multitude of 
challenges along the infrastructure lifecycle. This, we argue, will necessitate a move away 
from the traditional emphasis on achieving short term efficiencies in the operation of 
incumbent networks, towards a more dynamic model based on a socio-technical 
understanding which can address governance challenges at the different phases of 
transition. The infrastructure lifecycle model based on a cyclical and dynamic understanding 
of socio-technical systems provides a framework to understand these different phases of 
infrastructure change:  
For the case of an incumbent system like electricity distribution which needs to move into a 
renewal and transition phase, it is clear that the role of the regulator remains central. It will 
need to align its activities in a coherent manner with broader energy policy trends such as 
renewable generation and emissions reductions targets. This, however, presents challenges, 
since in a liberalised environment, the independence of sector regulators from government 
interference has been emphasised. A key challenge for the regulator in this new context of 
system renewal and transition will be to balance the interests of customers and 
shareholders whilst promoting risk taking and transformation, and at the same time 
maintaining quality standards. The case of electricity distribution in the UK shows how the 
UK regulator has begun to engage with this task by introducing incentives for long term 
investment horizons and CAPEX efficiency, whilst shifting its emphasis towards the 
regulation of specified performance outputs.  
A second issue facing incumbent sectors is a lack of innovation. Innovation is central to the 
development of long term investment strategies, the optimal utilisation of the existing asset 
base and the integration of various low carbon technologies. However, innovation in these 
sectors is less likely as they are currently locked-in to an established technological trajectory 
which has been reinforced by the regulatory framework and the strategies of incumbent 
actors. Also, they do not operate in a competitive environment as would be the case in 
conventional sectors. Therefore, being regarded as natural monopolies, network companies 
are unlikely to engage in innovation as a response to an external competitive threat and 
they must therefore be either incentivised or mandated to do so through the actions of the 
regulator. The UK regulator has been to the forefront of designing specific incentives for 
innovation and their experience should have valuable lessons for other regulators. However, 
because this process is at a relatively early stage, it remains to be seen how a separate 
incentive mechanism can be incorporated into the mainstream regulatory process and the 
day-to-day organisational routines of the network operators.  
The phase of system building and establishment poses a different set of questions, as 
highlighted by the challenges facing CHP/DH in the UK. These systems develop in local 
contexts, often removed from national level energy institutions, and therefore tend to lack a 
supporting institutional framework for their expansion. As a result, CHP/DH currently relies 
on motivated individuals who are acting in specific local contexts and as such the sector is 
quite fragmented and dispersed. It is clear from the discussion that along with increasing 
the resources available to local authorities, the development of knowledge and capacities 
for learning at the local level is essential. Combined with this, diffusing CHP/DH more widely 
will necessitate the development of a more coherent and robust set of sector level 
institutions which can disseminate best practice and reduce transaction costs. Also, the 
experience of Nordic countries illustrates the importance of significant government 
intervention in creating a favourable selection environment for CHP/DH. In Denmark, for 
example, the government introduced legislation which imposed a ban on waste heat and 
mandated connection to a heating network where it exists. It also changed its electricity 
market structure in order to explicitly recognise the environmental and system benefits of 
CHP/DH (Toke and Fragaki, 2008). The UK has however traditionally adopted technology 
ŶĞƵƚƌĂůĞŶĞƌŐǇƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐĂŶĚƐŽƵŐŚƚƚŽĂǀŽŝĚ ?ƉŝĐŬŝŶŐǁŝŶŶĞƌƐ ? ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇĨĂǀŽƵƌŝŶŐĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ
technologies over others. However, this strategy has been challenged on the grounds that in 
order to influence longer term transition processes and promote the diffusion of promising 
low carbon niches such as CHP/DH, governments need to take a more active role in setting 
priorities and directing change, particularly if there is a high degree of uncertainty in carbon 
and energy markets (Watson, 2008, Mitchell, 2008, Foxon and Pearson, 2007, Foxon and 
Pearson, 2008).  
Each of the cases highlight the fact that infrastructure transitions cannot be considered 
purely in technical terms, but rather as a coevolutionary process involving interactions 
between technologies, institutions, infrastructure users, business strategies and wider 
ecosystem change (Foxon, 2011). Due to the fact that infrastructures have public good 
characteristics, the role of bodies such as the sector regulator, local authorities and 
government is central to developing a synergistic and mutually beneficial relationship 
between these elements. 
Thinking beyond the particular cases of electricity and heat distribution in the UK, there may 
be some more generalizable insights here for other infrastructures which will be important 
enables for a low carbon transition. In the table below, we summarise how our main 
findings from the cases might be applicable to low carbon infrastructures in other sectors. 
Established national infrastructures such as gas supply and electricity transmission, although 
technically and operationally distinct, as regulated incumbent systems will face similar types 
of challenges in moving into a renewal and transition phase . For example, decarbonisation 
of the gas grid in a low carbon future may see increasing use of the existing infrastructure to 
transport biomethane and/or hydrogen (Dodds and McDowall, 2013), while new 
investments in electricity transmission networks will be required to access remote 
renewable resources and to interconnect with neighbouring markets to deal with concerns 
over intermittency of renewables (National Grid, 2011). On the other hand, the 
development of entirely new networks such as CO2 transport pipelines for carbon capture 
and storage technology, battery recharging infrastructure for electric vehicles and hydrogen 
transport and storage are at a nascent stage. Key issues to be addressed here in system 
building and establishment and moving into the expansion and momentum  phase will be 
the development of local organisational capacity and expertise along with financing 
mechanisms which help to overcome early stage project risks. 
An area for future research will be to conduct a cross-case analyse of these different 
infrastructure sectors to think through the technical, institutional and organisational 
similarities and differences, exploring implications for policy and governance. Also, as 
progress is made towards low carbon energy it is likely that complex interdependencies 
between the electricity, transport and heat sectors will emerge which will of course have 
implications at an organisational and institutional level. For example, new demands will be 
placed on the gas infrastructure as electricity generation from gas is phased out and only 
used as peaking plant during periods of low wind and high demand. Also, as we touched 
upon in section 4.1, the increasing electrification of the heat and transport sectors will 
require active management of electricity distribution networks to incorporate heat pumps 
and electric vehicles alongside distributed generation technologies.  
We argue that the socio-technical approach presented in section 3 can provide useful 
analytical tools to address these complex issues and provides the basis for a framework that 
can be employed across these different sectors, helping to better enable cross-sector 
learning.  
Table 3: Lessons for Governing Infrastructure Transitions from UK Case Studies 
Transition 
phase 
Stagnation and inertia moving into 
renewal and transition 
System building and establishment moving 
into expansion and momentum 
Examples of 
low carbon 
infrastructure 
x Smart grids/active distribution 
networks, 
x Electricity transmission for 
renewable resources and 
development of international 
 ?^ƵƉĞƌŐŝƌĚƐ ? 
x More flexible natural gas pipeline 
infrastructure 
x City wide district heating (UK) 
x hydrogen transport & storage 
x CO2 transport and storage  
x Electric vehicle recharging infrastructure 
Key 
governance 
Challenges 
x Short term investment horizons 
x &ŽĐƵƐŽŶ ?ƐǁĞĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĂƐƐĞƚƐ ? 
x Lack of innovation and risk 
averse business culture 
x Lack of a competitive threat for 
large network operators to 
develop business strategies 
based on innovation 
 
x Lack of supporting institutional 
structure for geographically 
dispersed niches 
x High rates of return demanded on 
investment capital 
x Lack of local level leadership and 
coordination 
x Underdeveloped technical and 
organisational capacity at the local 
level.  
Governance 
Strategies 
x Specific incentives for R&D and 
demonstration projects 
x Extend regulatory review periods 
x Closer scrutiny of business plans 
and investment proposals 
x Balance incentives for OPEX and 
CAPEX efficiency 
x Move towards outputs based 
regulation   
 
x Stronger government intervention in 
the market to support emerging 
technologies 
x Develop collaborative platforms for 
sharing best practice and knowledge 
exchange 
x Create incentives for system builders 
and reward initiative 
x Provide a stable investment 
environment  e.g. by government 
underwriting loans 
  
6 Conclusions 
This paper discussed the processes and mechanisms of infrastructure transition from a 
socio-technical systems perspective, focusing on electricity and heat distribution networks 
in the UK. Our purpose was to contribute to recent debates regarding the role and 
importance of infrastructure networks to broader sustainability transitions in the energy, 
water and mobility sectors (Frantzeskaki and Loorbach, 2010, Loorbach et al., 2010). 
Traditionally the focus of governance has been on reducing the cost of operating incumbent 
infrastructures, and existing policy and regulatory processes have only recently begun to 
consider how to transform these systems. The issue of how to develop and expand the new 
infrastructures necessary for the low carbon transition has received even less attention. We 
proposed that along an infrastructure lifecycle different governance strategies will need to 
be employed by policy makers and regulators to address the key governance challenges 
faced at different phases, particularly relating to the system renewal and transition, and 
system building and establishment stages 
In order to develop our arguments, we discussed the cases of electricity and heat 
distribution in the UK, which exemplify the challenges at these different stages. These 
distribution networks will be key to facilitating the development of a low carbon energy 
system; for example, by enabling the integration of renewable technologies, improving 
energy efficiency and enabling demand side management. We observed how recent efforts 
to transform these infrastructure networks have encountered a number of institutional 
challenges at different phases of the infrastructure lifecycle: In the case of electricity 
distribution, which needs to move from stagnation and inertia moving into a renewal and 
transition phase , the sector regulator has sought to overcome the barriers to long term 
investment and innovation, while in the case of district heating, which faces multiple 
barriers in the transition from system building and establishment into expansion and 
momentum, local authorities have struggled to finance large scale infrastructure 
investments and develop the necessary technical and organisational capacity at the local 
level.  
 
Overall however progress in this area has been piecemeal, largely due to fragmented sector 
structures and a lack of clear and consistent overarching framework for low carbon 
infrastructure governance. Developing a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics of 
socio-technical innovation in these infrastructure based sectors and recognising that 
governance interventions will need to be more targeted is perhaps a prerequisite to   
addressing this.   
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